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Abstract. The study addresses the impact 
of corporate governance on board 
compensation for the listed non-financial 
firms on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) for the period 2005-2015. 
We incorporated board independence, the board size, female directors, 
ownership concentration, adoption of CCG (code of corporate 
governance) as channels of corporate governance. Board 
compensation was measured by the natural log of the total board 
compensation. The study has controlled for firm size, firm 
performance, leverage, and cash flow from operation. By using the 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis technique together 
with robust standard error, the results reveal a significant relationship 
between corporate governance characteristics and board 
compensation. Findings suggest that corporate governance 
characteristics and ownership structure play an important role in 
determining board compensation. Board size and board independence 
exhibit a positive and significant relationship with board 
compensation. Additionally, consistent with previous literature, we find 
a negative relationship between gender diversity and board 
compensation. Ownership concentration shows a positive relationship 
with board compensation. Implementation of a code of corporate 
governance exhibits a positive and significant relationship with board 
compensation.  
Keywords:  Corporate governance; board compensation; ownership 
concentration; gender diversity; corporate governance index 
Introduction 
Board compensation has importance for the researchers, policymakers, and 
regulators. Previous researches have analyzed the factors which have an impact 
on management compensation (Cole & Mehran,  2008). However, the previous
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studies are not conclusive about the relationship between corporate governance 
and board compensation. Many researchers have argued that top management 
influences the compensation committee of the board for higher salaries 
(Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970). Board of directors take decisions regarding the 
compensation of directors, therefore there is a chance of expropriation by the 
directors.
 
Rent extraction theory states that the board can use private information and 
determine their compensation plans and increase their equity rewards(Lie, 
2005; Narayanan & Seyhun, 2005). Strong board members can effectively 
extract rent from the payment procedure and chances of expropriation are 
higher in badly governed firms (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999). This 
concern of insiders' influence is arising (Cadbury, 1992; Smith, Weinstein, & 
For The AABB Hemapheresis Committee, 2003). On the other hand, incentive 
alignment theory proposes stock options, and bonuses for the management and 
directors, which is confirmed through empirical pieces of evidence (Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2005; Hall & Murphy, 2002; Hanlon, Rajgopal, & Shevlin, 2003). 
Board of directors is responsible for deciding remuneration of the directors 
otherwise this responsibility is handed over to the remuneration committee, 
which is also formed by the board. So it is very interesting that ultimately 
directors decide directors' remuneration. Therefore, efficient corporate 
governance is extremely necessary for reducing the chances of expropriation. 
The literature on board compensation is concentrated in the developed world. 
This study will contribute to the literature by analyzing the effect of corporate 
governance on board compensation in Pakistan. Pakistan has different laws and 
institutional structures for firms as in developed countries. So, it will be 
attractive to examine the impact of corporate governance on the board 
compensation in developing economies like Pakistan.
 
The study investigates the effect of corporate governance on the board 
compensation in listed companies of Pakistan. This study provides insight into 
regulators regarding the current situation of board compensation in Pakistani 
listed non-financial companies. How corporate governance mechanism affects 
board compensation? What is the impact of independent directors on board 
compensation? What is the effect of the corporate governance index on board 
compensation? This research attempts to answer these questions.
 
The study adds to the previous literature by analyzing the impact of 
corporate governance characteristics such as board size, board independence, 
gender diversity on board compensation. The study also investigates the impact 
of external governance measured via the implementation of corporate 
governance act 2012 in Pakistan. The study investigates the impact of 
ownership concentration on board compensation; at last, the study develops a 
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composite governance index via principal components analysis (PCA) and 
investigates its impact on board compensation. 
 
This research provides an interesting context for board compensation as 
Pakistan's corporate characterized by poor internal and external governance, 
low shareholders rights, low implementation of governance laws along with 
family concentrated ownership. Hence, the results of the current research could 
be productive for investors, regulators, and legislators in their efforts to restrain 
the occurrence of bias compensation contracts.
 
The study proceeds by displaying theoretical and empirical literature and 
hypotheses about corporate governance and board compensation in the next 
section. Section 3 is specified for the research design and section 4 
demonstrates findings while section 5 concludes the article. 
2. Literature Review 
Literature about board compensation states that compensation of the directors 
is not only returning to the board of directors for higher firm value but it is also 
for making parallel their incentives to the shareholders' interest. Board 
compensation is linked positively with return on the stock (Clarkson, Walker, 
& Nicholls, 2011; Ghosh, 2006; Jaiswall & Firth, 2009; Parthasarathy, Menon, 
& Bhattacherjee, 2006). Literature has witnessed the relationship between top 
management compensation and recognizable characteristics of the firm. Large, 
miscellaneous, and developed firms have to hire high qualified CEOs. Hence, 
the author argued the positive relationship between the board compensation 
and the firm size in the USA, Hongkong, and Pakistan (Core et al., 1999), 
Hong Kong (Cheng & Firth, 2005), Pakistan (Ghosh, 2006; Jaiswall & Firth, 
2009; Parthasarathy et al., 2006; Tomar & Korla, 2011). In the USA, Hong 
Kong, and India the researchers like Smith (1992), Ho (2004), and Jaiswall and 
Firth (2009) subsequently argued that top management compensation will high 
in firms that have a high chance to improve the firm value. Large business 
difficulties result in a huge board of directors' pay (Ghosh, 2006). Large 
business ambiguity results in high risk for the board of directors and has huge 
pay. Therefore, there is a positive relationship between firm risk and top 
manager salary in the USA (Core et al., 1999). On the other hand, the authors 
argued a negative relationship between firm risk and board compensation and 
disagree with the risk in Indian firms as argued by (Ghosh, 2006; Jaiswall & 
Firth, 2009). Board compensation also shows a negative relationship with the 
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Many authors in their pragmatic studies have examined the relationship 
between board compensation and ownership structure. Some authors in their 
studies focus on corporate governance and board compensation. Although all 
the proofs are not clear that the ownership structure has an important role in 
board compensation of Indian companies. Chakrabarti, Megginson, and Yadav 
(2008) agued in their studies that there is a positive relationship between board 
compensation and non-supporter shareholders in Indian companies, but other 
authors did not discover any relationship between them in India.
 
Kaplan and Minton (1994) argued in their study that intense ownership is 
one of the essential tools of corporate governance reducing agency problems, 
and it is very good to govern the management (Shivdasani, 1993), and it can 
also result in interest of managers while using assets of the shareholder 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Strong ownership could also influence the structure 
of the pay level in a company. Many authors argued in their studies that there is 
a negative relationship between shareholder ownership and compensation level 
(Cheng & Firth, 2006; Core et al., 1999; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995). 
Concentrated ownership is ordinary in listed firms of the Asian capital market. 
According to the author argued in his study that small firms have a high level 
of strong ownership and which may have a low level of compensation as 
compared to their large competitors.
 
The number of shares detained by management influences the level of 
compensation, it can be positive or negative (Cheng & Firth, 2006). In previous 
studies some authors argued that there is a positive effect of shareholder 
ownership on the pay level, that is (Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome, & Weintrop, 
2007; Byrd, Cooperman, & Wolfe, 2010). (Andreas, Rapp, & Wolff, 2012; 
Core et al., 1999; Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2007; Mehran, 1995) argued in their 
studies that there is a negative association between shareholder ownership and 
compensation level. In the Asian capital market, listed companies are mostly 
controlled by family as argued by the author (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 
2000) therefore, the board of directors has family representation. 
 
2.1 Ownership Concentration and Compensation 
The level of ownership concentration is expected to impact the agency costs of 
the firm and among these, the amount of compensation granted to the 
management. As highlighted by Dyl (1988), in closely held corporations major 
shareholders have substantial economic incentives to monitor management's 
conduct, whereas in widely-held corporations no individual shareholder is 
likely to have sufficient motivation to engage in such monitoring activities. 
Closer monitoring activity is expected to reduce the manager's rent-extraction 
of shareholder's wealth, leading to lower management compensation.
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Concentrated firms signal to the market via appointing more independent 
directors on their boards and ultimately have to offer them high compensation. 
Further, they have higher resources and are less constrained hence can offer 
higher compensation to independent directors. Mostly they have large capital 
but low investment knowledge therefore they rely mostly on independent 
directors for mitigating agency cost. The opinion established above leads us to 
suppose high compensation for boards of concentrated firms.
 
H1: Ownership concentration has a positive relationship with Board 
compensation.
 
2.2 Board Size and Compensation 
Some of the authors used data of firms of the United States and found that the 
effect of board size is significantly positive on the level of pay (Conyon & He, 
2004; Core et al., 1999). Moreover, the authors argued in their studies that top 
managers have a positive effect level of board compensation (Sanders & 
Carpenter, 1998). Generally, large firms have larger boards. They have high 
knowledge, more skills, and expertise. Therefore, they are expected to have 
larger boards with competent directors with enough know-how and can afford 
to offer them high compensation Similarly, Conyon and He (2004) find that 
there is a positive relationship between board size and board compensation.
 
Based on resource theory larger boards can use their networking capabilities 
to improve a firm's performance which ultimately leads them to offer high 
compensation. In Pakistan, it is predicted that companies with large boards 
have more financial assets and offer high compensation. 
H2: Board Size and Board compensation are positively related. 
2.3 Board Independence and Compensation 
Al-Najjar (2014) found that board independence has a positive relationship 
with performance and therefore could be realized as an influential governance 
instrument and some authors argued that there is a negative association 
between board autonomy and pay level while using samples of Hong Kong and 
Malaysia (Wahab & Rahman, 2009). 
Independent directors are perceived to be more competent with a wide 
variety of skills and experience. In Pakistan, they are required to be qualified 
and certified from the Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance.  Darmadi 
(2011) suggests that board compensation increases with the inclusion of more 
independent directors. Larger firms tend to maintain more independent 
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H3: Board Independence and Board compensation are positively related.  
2.4 Gender Diversity and Compensation 
Recently, gender discrimination in compensation became a sensitive issue in 
developed countries such as the USA. Researchers also centered their attention 
on the issue and analyzed the gender differences from various perspectives 
such as recession period, overstated board compensation, stationary wages, and 
downsizing (Colvin, Green, Schmahl, Capel, & Ornitz, 2001; Kaplan, 2008; 
Walsh, 2008). The concern of gender discrimination is not only associated with 
those who face difficulties achieve higher positions in corporations. Gender 
discrimination also exists in compensation even they achieved the top position. 
Pakistan is a developing country where society is dominated by is males. By 
considering all the cultural, demographical, and socio-economic factors of 
Pakistan and also based on the discussion above we hypothesize that:
 
H4:  There is a negative relationship between female representation and board 
compensation
 
2.5 External Corporate Governance Mechanism and Compensation 
Security exchange commission of Pakistan (SECP) introduced a code of 
corporate governance, for the first time, in Pakistan in 2002 because of market 
regularity agency. Therefore, implementing efficient governance system firms 
can make progress in decision making and can increase value for the 
shareholders. Next time in 2012 corporate governance was issued which is 
further demanding from the listed firms in terms of corporate governance 
standards. Therefore, high scrutiny of directors is needed and more 
independent directors are required to be present on the boards after the 
implementation of code of corporate governance 2012 that leads to the higher 
board compensation, therefore, we hypothesize that
 
H5:  High Board compensation is expected in the post CG2012 act scenario.
 
3 Methodology 
The authors have used the ordinary least square method for analyzing the 
impact of corporate governance on the board compensation in the listed non-
financial on Pakistan Stock Exchange. We used the models given below to 
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The study has used panel data for non-financial listed firms at Pakistan stock 
exchange. The data period for the study is from 2009 to 2015. Data of the 
dependent variable of board compensation is collected from OSIRIS while data 
of the control variables like total assets, total debt, net income, cash flows from 
operations were collected from the balance sheet analysis issued by SBP (State 
Bank of Pakistan) while data relating to corporate governance variables like 
board size, board independence, gender diversity of the board, ownership 
concentration is hand collected from the annual reports issued by the 
companies on their websites. 
3.2 Definitions of Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Total board compensation: In Pakistan mostly companies display the total 
compensation of board in annual reports. 
The
 stock option, incentives, bonus, 
and other components of compensation is not disclosed in annual reports. 
That's why we consider total compensation as the dependent variable.
 
3.2.2 Independent Variables 
Table 1 Definitions of Variable 




Board_comp Natural log of board compensation 
2 Board size Bsize 







The number of non-executive directors 
divides by the total number of 
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Shares of largest shareholder divide by 













Dummy 1 for years after the adoption of 







Use PCA (Principal Component 
Analysis) technique to gather four 
variables i.e., Board Size, Board 
Independence, Ownership Concentration, 
and Adoption of Code
 




ROA Net income divided by Total assets. 




Cash Cash flow from operations. 
Source: Author’s calculations (2017) 
4  Analysis 
Table 2 the mean value of board compensation is 9.6243. We used a natural log 
of board size showing the mean value of 2.053. Board independence shows the 
proportion of independent directors in the board size showing the mean value 
of 0.1578, suggesting that 15.78% of averagely are independent directors in our 
sample firms. The mean value of the female director is 0.0831, suggesting that 
8% of averagely are female directors in our sample firms. We used the largest 
shareholder as a block holder showing the mean value of 0.3318. The mean 
value of CGI shows an average value of -1.8e-09 with the minimum value of -
2.6544 and a maximum value of 9.8478.
 
Table 2  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observation Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Board comp 1,010 9.62 2.26 1.10 15.70 
Bsize 673 2.05 0.12 1.10 2.94 
Board_ind 521 0.16 0.22 0 1 
Female director 230 0.08 0.15 0 0.57 
Own 
concentration 
669 0.33 0.24 0 1 
SECP 1,031 0.52 0.50 0 1 
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CGI 517 -1.81 1.05 -2.65 9.85 
Size 965 15.06 1.55 9.90 19.74 
Leverage 965 0.63 0.34 .01 0.99 
ROA 965 0.03 0.11 -.53 0.80 
Cash 702 12.41 1.93 4.03 18.19 
4.1 Correlation 
Table 3 shows a positive correlation of board compensation with board size, 
board independence, ownership concentration, adoption of code 2012 of 
corporate governance cash flows from operations, and profitability. The table 
depicts a negative correlation with female directors and leverage. Besides that, 
the above correlation table shows that the multicollinearity among independent 
variables is within the tolerable range which is also confirmed by variance 
inflation factors tables displayed along with all regression tables.
 
Table 3 Correlation Analysis 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 BC 1.00 
          2 BS 0.1 1.00 
         3 BI 0.01 -0.09 1.00 
        4 FD -0.19 -0.14 -0.01 1.00 
       5 OC -0.05 -0.11 -0.05 -0.01 1.00 
      6 SECP 0.04 -0.06 -0.06 0.06 0 1.00 
     7 CGI 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.1*** -0.11 0.8*** 0.7*** 1.00 
    8 Size 0.4*** 0.20* -0.12 -0.21 0.08 0.01 0.2*** 1.00 
   9 Lg -0.18 0.09 -0.1 0.24** -0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.31 1.00 
  10 ROA 0.2** -0.17 -0.124 -0.03 0.153 0.05 -0.04 0.06 -0.2 1 
 11 Cash 0.4*** 0.12 -0.16 -0.13 0.20* -0.02 0.3*** 0.7*** -0.3 0.3** 1 
Hints: BC=Board compensation; BS=Board size; BI=Board individual; 
FD=Female director; OC=Ownership concentration; CGI=Corporate 









Ownership concentration has a positive effect on board compensation which is 
significant at 5%. These results are consistent with (Basu et al., 2007; Byrd et 
al., 2010). It affirms the first hypothesis i.e. that concentrated firms signal to 
the market via bringing more independent directors on the board. And hence 
pays higher compensation. In the regressions in table 4, we have controlled for 
the firm size, firm leverage, firm performance, and cash flow from operations. 
All of the controls were having a positive impact except leverage.
 
Table 3 depicts that board size has a positive impact on board compensation 
which is significant at 5%. It affirms H2 and is consistent with (Conyon & He, 
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2004; Core et al., 1999). That confirms the notion that large firms are 
associated with large boards and appoint more competent directors thus 
requires high compensation. Table 4 depicts a positive association of board 
independence and board compensation which is significant at 10%. It suggests 
that independent directors are more competent and certified therefore they 
demand high compensation. 
 
The table affirms H4 & H5. Consistent with previous literature, Consistent 
with Soares (2010) the study found a significant and negative relationship 
between female directors and board compensation which affirms the hypothesis 
that female directors receive low compensation than their counterparts. 
Adoption of code 2012 of corporate governance has a positive relationship with 
board compensation which is significant at 1%. Our results show that the 
compensation of board increases after the adoption of the code 2012 of 
corporate governance.
 
4.3 Corporate Governance Index and Compensation 
Panel A of Table 5 depicts weights of all the mentioned four variables in the 
corporate governance index for Pakistani firms via principal components 
analysis. It depicts that board size, board independence; ownership 
concentration, and implementation of corporate governance code have a 
positive contribution to the corporate governance index. This indicates that 
large boards crowded by independent directors have good monitoring power. 
Similarly, firms with large shareholders have low agency problems. And the 
implementation of corporate governance code has contributed to the quality of 
corporate governance in Pakistani firms.  These are in line with the notion of 
the hypotheses of the thesis. 
 
Table 4 Corporate Governance and Board Compensation 




    
B.Size  0.99** (0.47)    
B. Indiv.   0.87*  (0.46)   
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Observations 475 475 369 164 692 
R-Squared 0.393 0.392 0.344 0.220 0.43 
F-Statistic 67.45 69.02 40.59 7.39 104 
F-Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) test is used to ensure that correlation between 
variables is higher than the correlation between errors.  KMO statistic was 
0.51. Panel B of Table 5 shows the relation between corporate governance 
index and compensation. The results show a positive and significant 
relationship between corporate governance and board compensation.
 
Table 5: Corporate Governance Index and Board Compensation 
Panel A: Weights of the Corporate Governance Index   
Variables Corporate Governance-Index  
Board Size 0.4814  
Board Ind 0.4658  
Ownership Concentration 0.4814  




Bartlett's test p-value 0  
Panel B: Corporate Governance Index and Board Compensation  
VARIABLES Board compensation VIF 
CGI 0.33*** (-0.83) 1.09 
 Size 0.51*** (-0.09) 2.6 
Leverage -0.12 (-0.27) 1.09 
ROA 3.59*** (-0.87) 1.12 
Cash 0.18*** (-0.07) 2.81 
Constant -0.39 –(0.96)  
Observation 368  
R-Squared 0.362  
F-Statistic 40.9  
F-Probability 0  
Mean VIF   1.86 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5 Conclusion 
The study aimed at investigating the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and board compensation. Board size, board 
independence, female directors, ownership concentration, and adoption of CCG 
(code of corporate governance), were used as channels of good governance. 
Then the corporate governance index was developed with the help of these 
aspects via principal component analysis. The study found a significant 
positive relationship between corporate governance index and board 
compensation and confirmed the notion that well-governed firms have more 
independent directors and large boards therefore they offer high compensation 
to their directors in Pakistan.
 
Board size also shows a positive impact on board compensation. It affirms 
the hypothesis of the study which was developed with the notion that large 
firms are associated with large boards and appoint more competent directors 
thus requires high compensation. Board independence presents a positive and 
significant relationship with board compensation. It suggests that independent 
directors are more competent and certified therefore they demand high 
compensation. Additionally, consistent with previous literature, we find a 
significant and negative relationship between female directors and board 
compensation which affirms the hypothesis that female directors receive low 
compensation than their counterparts. Furthermore, ownership concentration 
shows a positive impact on board compensation among Pakistani firms. We 
also analyze the relationship between corporate governance index and 
compensation in the previous analysis we identified the relationship between 
each corporate governance variable separately. But these indicators as a whole 
can have an impact on board compensation so we make an index which is 
consists of before mentioned indicators of corporate governance by using PCA 
(Principal Component Analysis) techniques. The results show a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between corporate governance and board 
compensation.
 
The findings of this thesis have a bearing for regulators, investors, and 
firms. The present study was conducted on a small sample therefore the results 
may be generalized with conscious. The study has collected compensation data 
from Osiris where bifurcation regarding executive and non-executive directors' 
compensation is unavailable for Pakistani firms. Therefore this bifurcation may 
provide interesting results. However, ultimately the study found that good-
governed firms in Pakistan provide higher compensation to their directors. 
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